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Audit summary 
Background 
Fraud is the crime of obtaining financial or another benefit by deception. The impact of 
fraud on councils and their communities can be significant. It can disrupt business 
continuity, reduce the quality and effectiveness of critical services, and threaten the 
financial stability of a council. It can also damage a council’s public image and 
reputation.  
Each year, local government collects $7 billion in operating revenues, expends 
$6 billion, and manages assets with a total value of $60 billion. These significant 
resources are at risk if councils are not active, vigilant and effective in dealing with the 
risk of fraud. 
The Local Government Act 1989 (the Act) requires councils to develop and maintain 
adequate internal control systems. An effective fraud control framework is widely 
recognised as a critical element of such systems. The Australian Standard  
AS8001–2008 on fraud and corruption control, and other related good practice guides, 
identify the key elements of an effective fraud control framework. These include: 
• a fraud control plan documenting an entity’s fraud prevention, detection and 
response initiatives 
• periodic and comprehensive assessment of an entity’s fraud risks  
• documented policies and procedures for dealing with suspected fraud, including 
protection for whistleblowers  
• a sound ethical culture supported by a code of conduct 
• regular fraud awareness training to maintain staff awareness of related policies 
and procedures  
• internal audits of the effectiveness of fraud controls and of related procedures 
• dedicated controls for activities with a high fraud risk exposure. 
Our 2008 report Local Government: Results of the 2006–07 audits undertook a high 
level review of fraud management practices across all 79 Victorian councils. It found 
that approximately one-third of councils had yet to develop a fraud control plan, clearly 
document their related policies and procedures, or provide management and staff with 
adequate training on identifying fraud risks. 
This audit assessed the effectiveness of fraud prevention strategies at Maroondah City 
Council, Nillumbik Shire Council, Moira Shire Council, Buloke Shire Council and West 
Wimmera Shire Council.  
We also tested the adequacy of controls for targeted high-risk fraud areas, known to 
account for the majority of frauds in public sector entities. 
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Conclusions 
The examined councils do not effectively manage their exposure to fraud risk as none 
have developed a strategic and coordinated approach to controlling fraud. This is 
concerning given the significant value of the public funds and assets they manage. 
While each of the five councils has aspects of a fraud control framework, critical 
elements are either absent or poorly implemented. 
Risk-based fraud control plans do not yet exist at all councils. Coupled with inadequate 
monitoring of the fraud control framework by management and audit committees, this 
shows they are not sufficiently vigilant nor effective in dealing with the risk of fraud. 
Without a risk-based fraud control plan there is no formal basis to assess whether 
fraud strategies are soundly based, coordinated, purposely implemented and 
reviewed.  
These shortcomings increase opportunities for fraud and thus put councils’ reputations 
and limited public funds at risk. 
Consequently, the examined councils cannot be assured that their fraud prevention 
strategies are effective and that all major fraud risks have been adequately mitigated.  
Councils, therefore, need to take the issue of fraud more seriously.  
The audit’s scope did not extend to undertaking an exhaustive fraud investigation. 
However, our targeted testing of high-risk areas disclosed a number of internal control 
deficiencies which further heighten the risk of fraud. 
Findings 
Limited improvements to fraud management practices since 2008 were evident at most 
examined councils. These included: 
• establishing specific fraud risk registers based on assessments of fraud risk––at 
Nillumbik and Buloke, with Maroondah in the process of developing one 
• issuing a code of conduct for staff, clarifying expected and unacceptable 
behaviours––at Maroondah, with codes already in place at the remaining councils 
• implementing a fraud policy detailing the consequences for fraudulent conduct, 
including procedures for managing allegations and incidents––at all councils 
except Moira 
• providing training to staff on their responsibilities for managing fraud risk––at 
Maroondah and Nillumbik.  
Although encouraging, these initiatives have not been sufficient to establish an 
effective fraud control framework at each council.  
The following sections highlight key shortcomings identified with existing fraud 
management arrangements, and the actions required to address them. 
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Fraud prevention strategies 
Fraud control plans, risk assessments and policies 
None of the examined councils had developed a fraud control plan, and only two out of 
five had completed assessments of their fraud risks at the time of the audit. 
Consequently, the fraud control strategies of all examined councils were neither 
adequately documented nor, in most cases, informed by a sound understanding of 
their exposure to fraud risk. Maroondah advised it completed its fraud risk 
assessments following the audit, and that this would inform its development of a fraud 
control plan. 
Although most councils had developed adequate fraud policies and codes of conduct, 
the absence of fraud control plans and completed fraud risk assessments 
demonstrates that, in most cases, these policies were not being effectively 
implemented or enforced by management. 
Further, while all councils relied on contractors and volunteers to deliver key services, 
only Maroondah had apprised them of its fraud policy. Similarly, none had distributed 
their code of conduct to contractors, and only Nillumbik had provided it to volunteers. 
This reduces assurance that contractors and volunteers at the remaining councils are 
clear as to what constitutes fraud and ethical behaviour, and what action they should 
take in the event they suspect a fraud has occurred. 
Moira acted to address this during the audit. 
Fraud awareness training 
With the exception of Nillumbik, none of the examined councils provided adequate 
fraud training to their staff.  
West Wimmera did not provide fraud awareness training to new and existing 
employees. Additionally, while the remaining councils informed new employees about 
the existence of their fraud policy and/or code of conduct, this was not adequately 
supported by further training and awareness-raising initiatives aimed at gaining 
assurance that staff understand their fraud control responsibilities.  
Maroondah began an extensive program of refresher training for existing employees in 
April 2011 and has since advised it will provide ongoing refresher and induction 
training for all staff. Moira and Buloke similarly commenced action to deliver fraud 
training to new and existing employees during the course of the audit.  
All councils had yet to establish arrangements for evaluating the adequacy of their 
fraud training and awareness programs. 
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Monitoring and oversight 
There was significant scope to improve monitoring and oversight of the fraud control 
framework at all examined councils.  
None had established effective arrangements for systematically monitoring and 
reporting on the performance of their fraud control activities to senior management and 
the audit committee.  
Consequently, the examined councils were unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
their fraud control framework. 
Internal audit 
All councils, except West Wimmera, had a risk-based internal audit program, however, 
none systematically reviewed the adequacy of their fraud management arrangements. 
This, coupled with the absence of completed fraud risk assessments at Maroondah 
and Moira, offered little assurance that council internal audit programs adequately 
addressed all major fraud risks. 
Moira conducted an audit of its fraud management framework in 2005. While the audit 
recommended it establish an integrated fraud control and risk management framework, 
this has yet to occur. 
West Wimmera advised it intends to establish an internal audit function in 2013–14.  
Audit committee 
Audit committees have a key role in monitoring councils’ fraud minimisation and 
detection programs, including whether there are strong internal controls to effectively 
manage key fraud risks. However, it was not evident that they actively monitored 
management’s efforts in implementing fraud prevention strategies.  
While all committees received reports and maintained a watching brief on suspected 
fraud incidents, they did not systematically review the effectiveness of the council’s 
wider fraud prevention framework. 
Further, West Wimmera’s and Maroondah’s audit committees lack sufficient 
independence from councillors and council staff as neither was comprised of a majority 
of independent members. This impedes their capacity to effectively scrutinise 
management actions. Maroondah advised it intends to address this by restructuring its 
committee’s membership so that the majority are independent. 
In addition, none of the councils adequately assessed the performance of their audit 
committee, and all relied overly on limited reviews of fraud management practices by 
their insurer. These reviews, however, have inherent limitations and do not provide 
sufficient assurance that fraud control arrangements are effective. 
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Internal controls to prevent and detect fraud 
No instances of fraud were identified in our targeted testing at the examined councils. 
However, a number of internal control weaknesses were observed which heighten the 
risk of fraud. These are outlined below.  
Pre-employment screening 
All examined councils had recruitment policies and procedures for pre-employment 
screening. However, none adequately addressed all major fraud risks. Specifically, 
only Moira and Nillumbik required verification of an applicant’s identity. Similarly, while 
all councils require a police criminal history check for some roles, only three of the five 
examined councils applied this to high fraud risk positions.  
Reference checks are mandatory at all councils. While they were evident in all cases 
examined at Moira, they did not occur in 80 per cent of the files examined at Nillumbik, 
69 per cent of files at Maroondah, and around half of the files reviewed at both Buloke 
and West Wimmera. Following the audit, Maroondah, Nillumbik and Buloke advised 
that practices have since been improved. 
Council policies require staff to verify the qualifications of new employees. This was 
evident in almost all files examined at four of the five councils. However, at Nillumbik, 
employee qualifications had been verified in only around 20 per cent of the files 
examined. 
Accounts payable 
Accounts payable relies on effective segregation of duties around the set-up and 
maintenance of vendor details to prevent payments to fictitious suppliers. This was the 
case for Nillumbik and West Wimmera, however, due to limited staffing and resources 
there was a lack of segregation of duties at the remaining three councils.  
Accounts payable staff at these councils can create and edit vendor details as well as 
enter invoices for payment. Although this increases the opportunity for fraud, both 
Maroondah and Moira have reasonable compensating controls.  
This was not the case at Buloke. While an independent officer signs off on a report of 
changes to vendor bank details, it is not supported by any documentation 
substantiating the changes. Without this the council is unable to verify if implemented 
changes are appropriate and, therefore, easily detect if a fraud has occurred. 
Asset management 
Maroondah, Nillumbik and Moira had adequate processes to safeguard their assets, 
however, there is scope for improvement at Buloke and West Wimmera. Neither 
council maintained an up-to-date and accurate asset register, nor did they assign a 
unique asset number to all assets so they could be traced. Additionally, West Wimmera 
did not do regular stocktakes.  
Audit summary 
xii       Fraud Prevention Strategies in Local Government Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
These weaknesses create an opportunity for assets to be misappropriated and 
misused without detection. 
Recommendations 
Number Recommendation Page 
 Councils should:  
1. develop and maintain an up-to-date fraud control plan 
clearly documenting their fraud prevention, detection and 
response initiatives and responsibilities 
19 
2. conduct thorough, periodic fraud risk assessments to 
assure they identify and effectively manage all major fraud 
risk exposures 
19 
3. provide induction and periodic fraud awareness training to 
all council staff, to assure they understand their fraud 
control responsibilities  
19 
4. systematically monitor and report on the effectiveness of 
their fraud control strategies 
19 
5. establish arrangements that assure effective ongoing 
scrutiny by executive management, internal audit and audit 
committees, of the effectiveness of the fraud control 
framework 
19 
6. establish effective pre-employment screening processes 
that provide sufficient assurance over the integrity, identity 
and credentials of all council staff 
27 
7. make sure accounts payable systems have effective 
preventative and/or compensating controls that adequately 
mitigate the risk of fraudulent purchases and/or payments 
27 
8. maintain accurate and an up-to-date asset registers that 
are regularly reviewed to mitigate the misuse and/or 
misappropriation of assets 
27 
9. systematically review the operation and effectiveness of all 
their internal control systems to assure they adequately 
prevent, deter and detect major frauds. 
27 
Submissions and comments received 
In addition to progressive engagement during the course of the audit, in accordance 
with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report was provided to the 
Department of Planning and Community Development, Maroondah City Council, 
Nillumbik Shire Council, Moira Shire Council, Buloke Shire Council and West Wimmera 
Shire Council with a request for submissions or comments. 
Agency views have been considered in reaching our audit conclusions and are 
represented to the extent relevant and warranted in preparing this report. Their full 
section 16(3) submissions and comments however, are included in Appendix A. 
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1 Background 
1.1 Introduction 
Fraud is the crime of obtaining financial or another benefit by deception. The Australian 
Standard for fraud and corruption control defines fraud as:  
‘Dishonest activity causing actual or potential financial loss to any person or entity 
including theft of moneys or other property by employees or persons external to the 
entity and where deception is used at the time, immediately before or immediately 
following the activity. This also includes the deliberate falsification, concealment, 
destruction or use of falsified documentation used or intended for use for a normal 
business purpose or the improper use of information or position for personal 
financial benefit’. 
Fraud can be perpetrated by employees, customers, contractors and external service 
providers, acting alone or in collusion. Research indicates that around 65 per cent of 
fraud is perpetrated by an employee. 
1.1.1 Major frauds by type 
There are many different types of fraud. Examples include: 
• theft of cash or assets 
• unlawful use of equipment including misuse of vehicles, telephones and other 
property or services 
• creating dummy or duplicate vendors to process fraudulent payments  
• falsifying expense claims 
• obtaining ‘kickbacks’ or bribes from suppliers or contractors 
• creating a ‘ghost’ employee and depositing their salary into the fraudster’s bank 
account 
• unauthorised use of a credit card 
• disclosure of sensitive or confidential information, with the discloser obtaining 
some benefit 
• falsifying academic or training credentials in an employment application. 
Figure 1A and 1B show the incidence and value of major fraud types in Australia and 
New Zealand based on the aggregated results of KPMG’s biennial fraud and 
misconduct survey of private and public sector entities from 2006, 2008 and 2010. 
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  Figure 1A
Proportion of major fraud incidences by type  
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from KPMG's Fraud and 
Misconduct Survey 2010, 2008 and 2006, Australia and New Zealand. 
  Figure 1B
Proportion of the value of major frauds by type 
 
Note: The total combined value of major frauds during the last three reporting periods was 
$142.6 million. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General's Office based on information from KPMG's Fraud and 
Misconduct Survey 2010, 2008 and 2006, Australia and New Zealand. 
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KPMG’s survey results show that the theft of cash, followed by the theft of assets, and 
accounts payable fraud accounted for almost 60 per cent of reported fraud incidents 
during the last three reporting periods. Similarly, these accounted for 70 per cent of the 
total value of all reported major frauds. 
1.1.2 Fraud in local government 
Fraud is a significant problem for private and public sector entities worldwide. 
However, quantifying the extent and cost of fraud is difficult because of its concealment 
by perpetrators, and the lack of reliable reporting. The Australian Institute of 
Criminology (AIC) estimates that for every fraud identified, there are three that go 
unreported or undetected.  
Each year, local government collects $7 billion in operating revenues, expends 
$6 billion, and manages assets with a total value of $60 billion. These resources are at 
risk if councils are not active, vigilant and effective in dealing with the risk of fraud.  
AIC estimates that all fraud costs the Australian economy around $8.5 billion per year, 
which includes reported and estimated fraud and associated costs. This represents 
around a quarter of the total cost of crime nationally. In Victoria, fraud is estimated to 
cost over of $640 million per year.  
The incidence and cost of fraud in the Victorian local government sector is unknown as 
there is no requirement for councils to compile and centrally report this information. 
However, research by PriceWaterhouseCoopers indicates that government and 
state-owned enterprises, on average, experienced a higher incidence of fraud than 
private entities. This suggests that fraud is an issue local government should be 
vigilant about. 
Incidences of fraud in local government 
Councils are custodians of significant public funds, and it is important that the public 
has assurance that these are adequately protected from fraud. 
Fraud can adversely impact a council’s ability to meet its legislative obligations and 
achieve its objectives. It can damage its public image and reputation and adversely 
impact on business continuity including service delivery and financial stability. A 
council’s finances may also be significantly impacted by fraud as usually only a small 
percentage of losses are recovered.  
A number of incidences of fraud have occurred recently in Victorian local government:  
• More than $377 000 was stolen from inner city council parking meters over a 
15-month period from 2007 to 2008. The thefts were committed by contracted 
employees responsible for collecting the council’s parking revenue. The offences 
were uncovered when an audit identified discrepancies in the revenue collected. 
In addition to the stolen money, the council incurred costs of over $76 000, 
including the repair of meters. The accused were all prosecuted and received 
sentences ranging from two to four years prison, suspended sentences and 
community-based orders. 
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• A senior compliance officer at another inner city council took bribes of more 
$134 000 between 2002 and 2010 from brothel operators. The officer agreed not 
to investigate breaches and to tip off operators about compliance inspections by 
the council. The offender was prosecuted and received a 20-month prison 
sentence. 
• An accounts payable clerk at another inner city council used 88 blank council 
cheques to steal a total of $596,868 over a two-year period between 
February 2005 and March 2007. The theft was found when the council changed 
computer software and reconciled its cheques. The offender was prosecuted and 
sentenced to two years and eight months jail. 
1.2 The regulatory framework 
Local Government Act 1989  
The Local Government Act 1989 commits councils to establishing a code of conduct 
and an audit committee, and to developing and maintaining adequate internal control 
systems. 
A fraud control framework is widely recognised as a critical element of such systems. 
Councils therefore have a responsibility to minimise opportunities for fraud, and to 
respond to inappropriate actions and behaviours. 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 
The Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 (the Act) facilitates the making of disclosures 
of improper conduct or detrimental actions by public officers and public bodies. The Act 
sets out procedures for both disclosure and investigation, and provides protection to a 
person who makes a disclosure as well as remedies for the person where detrimental 
action has been taken against them.  
Under the Act, each public body is also required to establish written procedures for 
handling any disclosures. 
Standards and guidelines 
The Australian Standard AS8001–2008, Fraud and Corruption Control provides 
authoritative guidance for organisations wishing to implement a fraud and corruption 
control program.  
Similarly, the Australian National Audit Office’s 2011 better practice guide, Fraud 
Control in Australian Government Entities, provides additional information on the 
principles and practices for effective control that are relevant to Victorian councils. 
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Local Government Victoria has also developed several better practice guides for 
councils that are relevant to fraud management: 
• Framework for the Development and Review of Council Staff Codes of Conduct, 
September 2011, which provides direction to councils in fulfilling their 
responsibilities to develop and implement a staff code of conduct under the 
Local Government Act 1989.  
• Conflict of Interest: A Guide for Council Staff, October 2011, which summarises 
staff obligations in regard to conflict of interest. Similar guidance was also 
developed for councillors in June 2011 and members of council committees in 
2012. 
• Audit Committees: A Guide to Good Practice for Local Government, 
January 2011, which aims to assist councils in establishing an effective audit 
committee.  
1.3 Key elements of effective fraud control 
To minimise the occurrence and impact of fraud, councils need a robust fraud control 
framework to prevent, detect and respond to fraud. The key elements of an effective 
fraud control framework, drawn from the Australian standard and other good practice 
guides, are shown in Figure . These elements are discussed in the following 
sections. 
C1C
  Figure 1C
Fraud Control Framework 
 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
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The fraud control plan is a critical component of an effective fraud control framework. 
The plan should: 
• communicate the council’s intent and responsibility for fraud management 
• contain key risks identified through the fraud risk assessments 
• outline the key internal controls in place to limit opportunities for fraud 
• set out monitoring and review activities to assure the council’s fraud control 
framework is effective. 
The fraud control plan should suit the needs of the council, and cover the essential 
elements required to effectively manage the council’s fraud risks. 
Communicating intent  
A fraud policy and code of conduct are key mechanisms for clearly articulating a 
council’s objectives and expected outcomes in managing fraud. An effective fraud 
policy clearly establishes a council’s attitude and approach to fraud control, while a 
code of conduct promotes high standards of ethical behaviour expected of staff and a 
council’s commitment to these standards. 
Setting the right ‘tone at the top’ is critical to fraud control. A council culture based on 
sound ethics and integrity, as displayed by senior management, underpins an effective 
fraud control framework. 
Identifying risks 
Developing an effective fraud control framework requires having a good understanding 
of a council’s key fraud risks.  
The fraud risk assessment should cover all the discrete functions and operations of a 
council. To assure an integrated and consistent approach, the assessment should also 
form part of a council’s overall risk management strategy. 
Limiting opportunities 
Once a council has established its fraud risk profile through a risk assessment 
process, it needs to implement dedicated internal controls—system, processes and 
procedures—that will minimise those risks. 
Raising awareness 
Fraud awareness training is an effective method of assuring that all employees, 
contractors and volunteers are aware of their responsibilities for fraud control and of 
expectations for ethical behaviour in the workplace. 
Monitoring  
Audit committee oversight is critical to the success of the fraud control framework. The 
audit committee should regularly review a council’s internal control, risk management 
processes and fraud control strategies. 
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An effective internal audit is a key mechanism available to councils to discharge this 
responsibility. Internal audits review internal controls for key risks, including fraud risk, 
within a council and provide assurance to management about the operating 
effectiveness of these controls.  
Senior management also have a role in reviewing the outcomes of monitoring activities 
and using the insights gained to inform continuous improvement in fraud prevention. 
1.4 Previous audit 
Our 2008 report Local Government: Results of 2006–07 audits included a high-level 
review of the fraud control framework of all 79 councils. It examined whether each 
council: 
• had a fraud policy, procedures and code of conduct 
• had a fraud control plan and associated strategies based on a comprehensive 
fraud risk assessment 
• provided fraud awareness training  
• maintained an appropriate level of insurance for fraud  
• implemented pre-employment screening processes.  
The audit found that approximately one-third of councils did not have a robust fraud 
control framework in place. These councils did not have clearly documented and 
up-to-date fraud policies and procedures, a fraud control plan, or provide adequate 
staff training on identifying fraud risks. The audit recommended that councils develop a 
fraud control plan and undertake fraud risk assessments as a priority, and review the 
adequacy of their fraud management policies and procedures. 
1.5 Audit objectives and scope 
The objective of this audit was to determine the effectiveness of fraud prevention 
strategies by local councils. Specifically, for a selection of councils the audit assessed 
whether they: 
• have an effective fraud control framework, which is integrated with their 
organisation-wide risk management strategy 
• have appropriate, well understood and current fraud control plans, which address 
major risks 
• have established effective fraud controls 
• have adequate internal systems, training and reporting processes to support 
effective implementation and monitoring of fraud control plans 
• regularly test, monitor and report on the effectiveness of the fraud control plan 
and associated practices 
• review the outcomes of testing and use the insights gained to inform continuous 
improvement in fraud prevention and to update fraud control plans to ensure their 
ongoing appropriateness. 
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The audit examined fraud prevention policies, plans and practices and the adequacy of 
selected fraud controls at the following councils:  
• Maroondah City Council—an inner metropolitan municipality 
• Nillumbik Shire Council—an outer metropolitan municipality 
• Moira Shire Council—a large rural municipality 
• Buloke Shire Council—a small rural municipality 
• West Wimmera Shire Council—a small rural municipality. 
1.6 Method and cost 
The audit was conducted in accordance with the Australian Auditing and Assurance 
Standards. The cost of the audit was $485 000. 
1.7 Structure of the report 
The report is structured as follows: 
• Part 2 discusses fraud prevention strategies 
• Part 3 discusses key internal fraud controls. 
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2 Fraud prevention strategies 
At a glance 
Background  
The foundation of any good fraud control framework is a set of integrated prevention 
strategies. While fraud cannot be eliminated, the risk of it occurring can be 
substantially reduced if councils adopt targeted preventative measures. 
Conclusion 
None of the councils examined have adopted a strategic and coordinated approach to 
the management of fraud risk. The absence of fraud control plans at all five examined 
councils, and completed risk assessments at three of the five, means that none can be 
assured that their fraud prevention strategies are effective and that fraud risks have 
been adequately mitigated. 
Findings  
• None of the councils examined have developed appropriate fraud control plans.  
• Three of the five councils examined had not assessed their fraud risks at the time 
of audit. Maroondah addressed this following the audit. 
• All councils, except Moira, had developed adequate fraud policies, however, they 
had not been effectively implemented. 
• Four of the five councils examined had not distributed their fraud policy and code 
of conduct to contractors and volunteers. 
• Only Nillumbik has provided staff with sufficient training on identifying fraud risks. 
• None of the councils had adequately assessed the performance of their fraud 
control activities. 
Recommendations 
Councils should: 
• develop and maintain an up-to-date fraud control plan and associated strategies 
based on a comprehensive assessment of fraud risks 
• systematically monitor and report on the effectiveness of their fraud control 
framework. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Sound prevention strategies are the foundation of a reliable fraud control framework. 
While they cannot eliminate fraud risk, coordinated and effectively implemented 
strategies can minimise the chances of it occurring. 
Key preventative measures critical to a sound fraud control framework include:  
• a fraud control plan documenting the responsibilities for fraud prevention, 
detection and response initiatives  
• periodic fraud risk assessments to identify and treat major fraud risks, and inform 
the fraud control plan 
• a fraud policy establishing clear standards and procedures for dealing with 
suspected fraud incidents 
• a code of conduct clarifying the council’s expectations for ethical behaviour that is 
demonstrably adhered to and promoted by senior management 
• regular staff fraud awareness training on their responsibilities for identifying, 
preventing and reporting potential wrongdoing 
• scrutiny by internal audit and the audit committee of the effectiveness of the 
council’s fraud control framework and related activities  
• effective controls for activities with a high fraud risk exposure. 
Once implemented, these preventative measures should be regularly monitored and 
evaluated to assure their effectiveness in operation. 
This Part of the report assesses the adequacy of the fraud control framework at each 
examined council. Specifically, it examines whether fraud control plans and associated 
strategies are soundly based and minimise opportunities for fraud to occur. 
2.2 Conclusion 
The examined councils have not yet developed a strategic and coordinated approach 
to the management of fraud risk. Although most have a fraud policy and all have a 
code of conduct setting standards for ethical behaviour, this is only part of the solution.  
The absence of documented fraud control plans at all five councils, and completed risk 
assessments at Maroondah, Moira and West Wimmera, means fraud policies were 
neither effectively implemented nor enforced. Therefore these councils could not be 
assured that their fraud prevention strategies were effective and that all material fraud 
risks had been identified and adequately mitigated. 
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Figure 2A summarises the adequacy of each council’s fraud control framework. 
  Figure 2A
Assessment of council’s fraud control framework 
Key feature Maroondah Nillumbik Moira Buloke 
West 
Wimmera 
Fraud control plan in place 
documenting the council’s 
approach to controlling fraud 
(a)     
Thorough fraud risk 
assessment undertaken 
(a)     
Policy provides sufficient 
guidance on managing fraud 
  ×   
Code of conduct sets clear 
standards for ethical 
behaviour 
     
Regular fraud awareness 
training provided to staff 
(a)  (a) (a)  
Audit committee effectively 
scrutinises operation of fraud 
control framework. 
     
(a) Council took action to strengthen practices during the audit. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
2.3 Fraud control framework 
Each examined council has aspects of a fraud control framework in place. However, all 
the practical elements required for effective fraud control are not yet established or 
fully integrated. 
Specifically, none of the councils have clearly documented their actions for 
implementing and monitoring key fraud control initiatives. Additionally, none have 
developed adequate indicators for evaluating the effectiveness of their initiatives. 
The councils advised that these weaknesses were influenced by ongoing resource 
constraints and the difficulty of attracting and retaining staff skilled in fraud control, 
particularly in regional and rural areas. 
The following sections summarise the key issues identified at each council. 
2.3.1 Fraud control plan 
A soundly based fraud control plan is a critical element of a council’s fraud control 
framework. However, all five examined councils had yet to develop such a plan.   
The fraud control plan documents the approach to controlling fraud at a strategic, 
tactical and operational level, including the responsibilities for implementing and 
monitoring related activities.  
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Key features of a sound fraud control plan include: 
• a summary of the council’s major fraud risks identified through a robust fraud risk 
assessment 
• details of strategies and controls for mitigating material fraud risks 
• clear roles and responsibilities for implementing and monitoring key prevention, 
detection and response initiatives 
• performance measures, including procedures for assessing the plan’s 
effectiveness. 
A sound fraud control plan provides the basis on which a council can obtain assurance 
that it is aware of all its major fraud risks, and that it has adequate prevention, 
detection and response initiatives in place. 
The fraud control plan should be periodically reviewed and updated, as needed, 
following an assessment of its effectiveness. It should also be tailored to the needs of 
each council, reflecting its relative size, structure and fraud risk profile. 
It is important to note that a fraud control plan is a key operational document that 
explains how the council’s discrete fraud policy, risk register, prevention, detection and 
response strategies should coordinate, be operationalised and reviewed. Therefore, 
the plan is not simply a mechanism for physically co-locating these separate elements, 
it is the overarching guiding framework that demonstrates their effective coordination in 
practice. 
The absence of a fraud control plan at the selected councils means they cannot 
demonstrate their fraud prevention, detection and response strategies are soundly 
based, coordinated, purposely implemented and reviewed. 
2.3.2 Identifying fraud risks 
Fraud risk assessment 
Effective fraud management depends on a thorough fraud risk assessment, but this 
had not yet occurred at most examined councils. Only Nillumbik and Buloke had 
thoroughly assessed their fraud risks and had developed a fraud risk register at the 
time of the audit. 
These shortcomings mean that most examined councils could not demonstrate they 
were effectively managing all their major fraud risks as unidentified risks cannot be 
planned for and addressed.  
Fraud risk management is an important adjunct to a council’s risk management 
framework. It goes beyond considering general risks to the achievement of strategic 
objectives normally found in corporate risk registers, to identifying, analysing and 
addressing specific fraud risks. 
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Apart from Buloke and Nillumbik, the remaining councils mainly relied on their 
corporate risk registers as the foundation for managing their fraud risk. However, West 
Wimmera’s corporate risk register was incomplete and did not include any fraud risks. 
Similarly, Maroondah’s and Moira’s corporate risk registers contained a limited number 
of fraud risks, but there was little assurance they reflected all major fraud exposures in 
the absence of completed fraud risk assessments.  
Moira’s risk register also lacked information about the adequacy of existing controls for 
some listed fraud risks. Therefore, it was not evident how the council had determined 
the risk rating in these cases. 
Maroondah had commenced work prior to this audit to strengthen its fraud control 
framework. It was in the process of developing an organisation-wide fraud risk register, 
which had already led to improvements to some of its controls. Maroondah advised 
following the audit that it completed its fraud risk assessments, and that this would 
inform its development of a fraud control plan. 
These actions are positive and the council intends to use the insights from this audit to 
inform its future improvement initiatives. 
2.3.3 Communicating intent 
A well understood fraud policy and code of conduct that is demonstrably adhered to 
and promoted by senior management is essential for establishing a sound ethical 
culture.  
Most examined councils had adequate fraud policies and codes of conduct. However, 
the absence of fraud control plans and completed fraud risk assessments 
demonstrates that, in most cases, these policies have not been effectively 
implemented and enforced by management.  
Fraud policy 
A sound fraud policy should include: 
• a definition of fraud  
• a clear statement of the council’s tolerance and attitude towards fraud 
• the required standards and procedures for preventing, detecting, reporting and 
investigating suspected fraud incidents 
• staff responsibilities for mitigating fraud risks and managing fraud incidents 
• staff responsibilities for reviewing and updating the policy 
• information on where further details can be found about specific fraud 
management responsibilities. 
The policy should also be regularly reviewed and distributed widely throughout the 
council including, where necessary, to contractors and volunteers. 
All councils, except Moira, had developed adequate fraud policies.  
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Moira had yet to develop a specific fraud policy, and instead relied on fraud detection 
and reporting procedures contained within its code of conduct. These procedures, 
however, are limited and do not address the requirements for implementing effective 
fraud prevention strategies. 
Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 
The Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 requires all councils to have written 
procedures for handling and investigating disclosures about improper conduct by 
public officers and/or bodies. The Act provides protection to a person who makes such 
a disclosure, and offers remedies for detrimental action taken against them.  
Only three of the five examined councils—Maroondah, Moira and Nillumbik—had 
established written procedures for managing allegations arising from protected 
disclosures and made explicit reference to these within their fraud policies. 
While Buloke and West Wimmera include a general reference to the Act, neither policy 
refers to such procedures as they don’t exist.  
Consequently, Buloke and West Wimmera are less likely to adequately discharge their 
statutory responsibilities for whistleblower protection when responding to alleged fraud 
incidents. 
Buloke developed training on the general requirements of the Act during the course of 
the audit. Although positive, this initiative does not acquit its statutory obligation to 
develop written procedures for handling protected disclosures. 
Code of conduct 
The Local Government Act 1989 requires the chief executive officer to develop and 
implement a code of conduct for council staff.  
In 2011, the Department of Planning and Community Development released guidance 
for councils, titled Framework for the Development and Review of Council Staff Codes 
of Conduct, to assist them meet this statutory requirement.  
We found that all councils had implemented a code of conduct for staff consistent with 
the requirements of the Act. However, there was significant scope for improvement at 
West Wimmera as its code does not clearly convey who it applies to, what happens if 
there is a breach, where to report a breach, or how staff conflicts of interests should be 
managed. 
Therefore, it fails to inform staff clearly about what constitutes ethical behaviour, and 
the likely consequences, including disciplinary action, of breaches of the code.  
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Coverage of contractors and volunteers 
While all councils relied on contractors and volunteers to deliver key services such as 
information technology, statutory planning, emergency management and recreational 
services, only Maroondah had apprised them of its fraud policy. Similarly, none had 
distributed their code of conduct to contractors, and only Nillumbik had provided it to 
volunteers. 
This reduces assurance that contractors and volunteers at the remaining councils are 
clear as to what constitutes fraud and ethical behaviour, and what action they should 
take in the event they suspect a fraud has occurred. 
Moira acted to address this during the audit. 
2.3.4 Raising awareness  
Fraud training 
Induction and periodic refresher training for staff assists in assuring they are aware of 
and understand their fraud control responsibilities. 
However, except for Nillumbik, none of the remaining councils provided adequate 
training to their staff.   
Specifically, West Wimmera had yet to establish arrangements to train its staff on fraud 
control.  
Similarly, while Maroondah, Moira and Buloke informed new employees about their 
fraud policy and/or code of conduct, this was not sufficient to assure staff understood 
their fraud control responsibilities in the absence of supporting training.  
The weakness of this approach was highlighted by the Australian National Audit Office 
in its 2011 better practice guide Fraud Control in Australian Government Entities. 
Specifically, it noted an internal review by the New Zealand Inland Revenue 
Department which found that its employees did not generally read the organisation’s 
code of conduct until it was breached.  
Maroondah began an extensive program of refresher training for existing employees in 
April 2011, and advised that it has now completed the training for all staff. While, it had 
yet to introduce induction training for new employees it has since advised that it will 
provide ongoing refresher and induction training for all staff. 
Moira and Buloke similarly commenced action to deliver fraud training to new and 
existing employees during the audit. 
All councils are yet to develop systems for evaluating the quality and effectiveness of 
their training programs. Consequently there is little assurance the training has been 
successful and that staff are sufficiently aware of their fraud control responsibilities.  
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Nillumbik provided both induction and regular refresher training to all staff on fraud and 
the code of conduct, requiring a minimum pass score of 80 per cent. Testing whether 
participants achieve the required minimum score is a positive initiative that assures 
they understand the content, but is not equivalent to evaluating the quality and 
effectiveness of the training provided in terms of whether it is fit for purpose. 
2.3.5 Monitoring 
There was significant scope to improve monitoring and oversight of the fraud control 
framework at all examined councils. 
None had established effective arrangements for systematically monitoring and 
reporting on the performance of their fraud control activities to executive management 
and the audit committee. 
Consequently, the examined councils were unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
their fraud control framework. 
Internal audit 
Internal audit has an important role to advise the audit committee about the 
effectiveness of a council’s internal controls and fraud prevention strategies. However, 
West Wimmera had yet to establish an internal audit program and none of the 
remaining councils adequately review existing fraud control arrangements. 
Further, while the program was periodically reviewed by the audit committee, the 
absence of completed fraud risk assessments at Maroondah and Moira offered little 
assurance in each case that it adequately addressed all major fraud risks. 
Additionally, none of the internal audit programs systematically reviewed the adequacy 
of the council’s wider fraud control arrangements. Most focused instead on targeted 
reviews of key controls associated with high-risk financial functions, such as payroll, 
accounts payable and cash handling.  
While these reviews are useful, broader audits of organisational fraud management 
arrangements can assist a council to gain a better insight into the adequacy of its fraud 
control framework and of the extent of compliance with related fraud policies and 
procedures. 
Moira conducted an audit of its fraud management framework in 2005. While the audit 
recommended it establish an integrated fraud control and risk management framework, 
this has yet to occur.  
Nillumbik had scheduled an audit of fraud management in its forward program for 
completion by 30 June 2012.  
The current absence of an internal audit program at West Wimmera represents a 
significant gap in the council’s governance framework, and offers little assurance over 
the effectiveness of existing fraud controls. West Wimmera advised during the audit 
that it intends to establish an internal audit program in the 2013–14 financial year. 
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The following case study derived from a recent investigation by the NSW Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) shows how the absence of an internal audit 
function at a council can create an environment in which fraud can easily occur. 
  Figure 2B
Impact from the absence of internal audit  
ICAC investigated a number of allegations in relation to the general manager of the 
Burwood City Council in NSW. The general manager was using council staff to work on his 
private residence and investment property. He also used council funds totalling more than 
$35 000 to install security equipment at his home and hired a friend as the principal council 
architect without disclosing their relationship. 
ICAC found that the absence of an internal audit function was a significant factor that 
allowed the general manager to undertake inappropriate expenditure and to hide it from 
council. This represented an obvious governance weakness.  
Without this independent source of information from internal audit, councillors were only 
provided information the general manager was willing to provide. 
ICAC recommended that establishing an internal audit function become a statutory 
responsibility for local councils. In the case of small councils, the possibility of them sharing 
an internal audit function was also provided as an option. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office based on ICAC’s 2010–11 Annual Report. 
Audit committee 
Audit committees have a key role to monitor a councils’ fraud minimisation and 
detection programs. Relevant good practices identified within Local Government 
Victoria’s 2011 guide Audit Committees: A Guide to Good Practice for Local 
Government include monitoring: 
• whether fraud risks have been adequately identified, assessed and mitigated 
• management’s efforts to establish strong internal controls  
• the council’s fraud prevention and detection framework, including any action 
taken with respect to actual and suspected instances of fraud. 
However, it was not evident that council audit committees actively monitored 
management’s efforts in implementing fraud prevention strategies. While all 
committees received reports and maintained a watching brief on suspected fraud 
incidents, they did not systematically review the effectiveness of the council’s wider 
fraud prevention framework. 
Buloke advised that it considered regular reviews by its audit committee of council’s 
fraud risk register as indicating that it adequately assesses fraud activities. However, 
this could not be substantiated as meeting minutes only indicate that the risk register is 
noted by the committee, and do not document its discussions and assessments of the 
wider fraud control framework. 
Local Government Victoria’s good practice guide also highlights the importance for the 
majority of audit committee members to be independent of council management, and 
for periodic reviews of the audit committee’s performance. 
Fraud prevention strategies 
18       Fraud Prevention Strategies in Local Government Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
      
 
 
At West Wimmera the audit committee does not include any independent members 
and consists of councillors and senior council staff. Similarly, at Maroondah the audit 
committee does not comprise a majority of independent members. Consequently these 
audit committees lack sufficient independence, which impedes their capacity to 
effectively scrutinise management actions. Maroondah advised it intends to address 
this by restructuring its committee’s membership so that the majority are independent. 
Further, none of the councils adequately assessed the performance of their audit 
committee. Buloke’s audit committee undertook a self-assessment in 2011. While the 
outcome was generally positive, the assessment had inherent limitations as it relied 
solely on the unverified perceptions of existing audit committee members without 
reference to objective criteria and supporting evidence. 
2.4 Evaluation and continuous improvement 
Periodic evaluations of a council’s fraud control arrangements are important for 
continuous improvement and for assuring they remain effective. Specifically, they can 
assist in determining: 
• the relevance and priority of fraud strategies in light of current and emerging risks 
• whether fraud strategies are effectively targeting the right and/or desired areas 
• whether there are more cost-effective ways of managing key fraud risks. 
None of the councils had adequately assessed the performance of their fraud control 
activities, nor had they internal reporting processes that adequately monitored 
compliance with their fraud policies or procedures.  
Additionally, none had adequate arrangements for detecting fraud in the event that 
their preventative systems failed. For example, none had performed regular data 
mining and forensic data analysis to detect potential fraud incidents.  
Consequently, the examined councils cannot demonstrate that their current fraud 
control arrangements are effective.  
Notwithstanding, limited improvements to fraud management practices since our 2008 
review were evident at most examined councils. These included: 
• establishing specific fraud risk registers based on assessments of fraud risk––at 
Nillumbik and Buloke, with Maroondah in the process of developing one 
• issuing a code of conduct for staff clarifying expected and unacceptable 
behaviours––at Maroondah, with codes already in place at the remaining councils 
• implementing a fraud policy detailing the consequences for fraudulent conduct 
including procedures for managing allegations and incidents––at all councils 
except Moira 
• providing training to staff on their responsibilities for managing fraud risk––at 
Maroondah and Nillumbik.  
Further improvements were also evident from our reviews of the external assessments 
of fraud management practices at Nillumbik, Moira, Buloke and West Wimmera by 
their fidelity insurer.  
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These assessments involve assigning a score to each council based on a limited 
review of their corporate governance, fraud policy, fraud risk assessments, controls, 
and fraud awareness training. All examined councils showed an improvement from 
their previous assessment—ranging from a 16 per cent increase in score at West 
Wimmera to 32 per cent at Nillumbik, 52 per cent at Buloke and 55 per cent at Moira.  
These reviews, however, do not provide sufficient assurance that fraud control 
arrangements are effective as they are high-level in nature and exclude key fraud 
control initiatives essential for good practice, such as whether councils have a fraud 
control plan in place.  
Therefore, while the improvements are encouraging, they have not been sufficient to 
establish an effective fraud control framework at each council.  
Recommendations 
Councils should: 
1. develop and maintain an up-to-date fraud control plan clearly documenting their 
fraud prevention, detection and response initiatives and responsibilities 
2. conduct thorough, periodic fraud risk assessments to assure they identify and 
effectively manage all major fraud risk exposures 
3. provide induction and periodic fraud awareness training to all council staff, to 
assure they understand their fraud control responsibilities  
4. systematically monitor and report on the effectiveness of their fraud control 
strategies 
5. establish arrangements that assure effective ongoing scrutiny by executive 
management, internal audit and audit committees, of the effectiveness of the 
fraud control framework. 
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3 Key internal fraud controls 
At a glance 
Background  
Internal controls consist of the systems, processes and procedures that enable a 
council to respond appropriately to any type of risk. The Local Government Act 1989 
requires councils to develop adequate internal controls to meet their objectives. 
Conclusion 
No instances of fraud were identified by our targeted testing at the examined councils. 
However, it revealed a number of control deficiencies with pre-employment screening, 
accounts payable processes and asset management which heighten the risk of fraud. 
Findings  
• While all examined councils had recruitment policies and procedures for 
pre-employment screening, none adequately addressed all fraud risks. 
• There was a lack of segregation of duties in accounts payable at Maroondah, 
Moira and Buloke which poses a fraud risk. Reasonable compensating controls, 
however, had been put in place at Maroondah and Moira increasing the chances 
that fraud will be detected. 
• Controls to safeguard assets can be improved at two of the examined councils. 
Recommendation 
• Councils should assess and where necessary strengthen their internal controls to 
assure they efficiently and effectively mitigate their fraud risks. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Research by KPMG indicates that more than half of all major frauds occur because of 
poor internal controls or the overriding of these controls. 
Adequate internal control systems are critical for preventing and detecting frauds. The 
nature and extent of these systems should reflect each council’s unique operating 
environment, fraud risk profile and available resources.  
Although strong preventative controls are the best defence against fraud risk, 
establishing them may not always be feasible because of resource constraints, 
particularly at smaller rural councils. In these cases, effective compensating controls 
are needed. These are normally detective in nature as they generally operate after a 
fraud has occurred.   
While this is less satisfactory than preventing a fraud, it represents a practical 
approach for small resource-constrained councils to mitigating the increased risk 
through deterrence. 
This Part of the report examines the effectiveness of internal controls at selected 
councils for activities with a high fraud risk. 
3.2 Conclusion 
All councils examined had internal controls to mitigate fraud risks but they were not 
consistently enforced which reduces their effectiveness in operation. A number of 
control breaches were identified which increase the opportunities for fraud to occur. 
These breaches indicate a need for closer monitoring and enforcement of the internal 
control framework by executive management to reduce their incidence and gain 
greater assurance of compliance with key fraud prevention strategies. 
3.3 Adequacy of selected controls 
We undertook targeted testing of the following four council functions with a high fraud 
risk to assess the effectiveness of fraud controls: 
• cash handling 
• pre-employment screening 
• accounts payable 
• asset management. 
Collectively, these functions typically account for almost 60 per cent of all reported 
major fraud incidents across both private and public sector entities, and 70 per cent of 
the value of all such frauds.  
The scope of this audit did not extend to undertaking an exhaustive forensic fraud 
investigation. The audit did not identify instances of fraud.  
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However, the targeted testing revealed a number of internal control deficiencies 
relating to pre-employment screening, accounts payable and asset management which 
heighten the risk of fraud. Cash handling controls were found to be adequate at all 
examined councils. 
Where possible, the potential consequences of the risks we identified are highlighted 
by examples of actual incidents to illustrate the need for addressing them. 
3.3.1 Pre-employment screening  
Pre-employment screening is important for gaining assurance as to the integrity, 
identity and credentials of staff employed by the council.  
While all examined councils had policies and procedures for dealing with employment 
screening, these generally fell short of good practice and did not fully address existing 
opportunities for fraud.  
Verification of applicants identity 
Only Moira and Nillumbik require the verification of an applicant’s identity. However, 
Moira’s recruitment policy only requires one form of identity document, rather than two 
and Nillumbik’s fraud policy does not clarify the minimum standards for identity 
checking. Seeking two forms of identity, such as a passport, full birth certificate or 
drivers licence is important for corroborating the information supplied by prospective 
employees. 
Nillumbik advised that it obtains proof of identity as part of its police checks. However 
its recruitment policy only mandates this for particular positions. As a result, this 
practice does not assure coverage of all council staff. 
Police criminal history checks 
All councils require a police criminal history search for some positions. However, only 
three of the five examined councils applied this to high fraud risk positions dealing with 
cash or financial management duties. All files reviewed at Nillumbik and Buloke 
showed that a police criminal history check had occurred, but this was not evident in 
the files examined at Moira. 
Further, Maroondah and West Wimmera mainly undertook mandated criminal history 
searches for positions involving working with children or the aged—not for positions 
that handle cash or have a high risk of fraud.  
Reference checks 
Reference checks are mandatory at all councils. While they were evident in all cases 
examined at Moira, they did not occur in 80 per cent of the files at Nillumbik, 
69 per cent of files at Maroondah, and around half of the files reviewed at both Buloke 
and West Wimmera. Maroondah, Nillumbik, Moira and Buloke advise that their current 
practices have improved. 
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Verification of qualifications 
All councils, except Nillumbik, systematically verified employee qualifications. Nillumbik 
had only verified the qualifications of staff in around 20 per cent of the files examined.  
Nillumbik advised they sometimes relied on previous employers having already verified 
the qualifications of an applicant. Consequently, there is little assurance its current 
procedures for recruiting staff adequately mitigate the potential for fraud to occur.  
The following case study drawn from CPA Australia’s 2011 guide on mitigating 
employee fraud highlights the importance of verifying an applicant’s credentials. 
  Figure 3A
Case study: Employment screening  
A telecommunications company recruited a sales manager to reorganise and expand their 
business into new geographic areas. The successful applicant claimed possession of two 
degrees and a masters. The employer was impressed that they could recruit such a 
well-qualified applicant at a relatively low salary. 
The employee: 
• set up a program to expand the business into a new geographic area 
• expanded the range of products the business sold 
• expanded the business into retail. 
However, after a while the company began to sense that something was not right as they 
had to send the employee on an Excel course as his spreadsheet skills were poor. This did 
not equate with someone who was so well qualified. Further, the employee informed 
management that in order to expand the business they needed to go through a particular 
distributor, and to establish a relationship they had to pay the distributor $10 000 in cash. 
The company then initiated further background checks on the employee, including checking 
with the education institutions the employee claimed to have graduated from. These checks 
revealed that the employee did not have the claimed qualifications. 
Further investigation discovered the employee: 
• had organised ‘kickbacks’ with suppliers of the new of products 
• was stealing stock, including expensive electronic equipment. 
Two days after the dismissal, the individual found new employment and was seeking to 
establish a similar fraudulent arrangement with the same suppliers. 
Upon discovering that the employee had falsified their qualifications, the company promptly 
dismissed the employee and notified the police.  
It now requires all prospective employees to produce original certificates of qualifications 
and also checks with their prior employers and referees. 
Source: Employee fraud: A guide to reducing the risk of employee fraud and what to do after a 
fraud is detected, CPA Australia. 
As pre-employment checks may stop perpetrators of fraud moving from one 
organisation to another, all councils should satisfy themselves that their processes and 
procedures for recruiting staff adequately minimise the potential for this to occur.  
Accounts payable 
The accounts payable function at each council has a high risk of fraud given the 
volume and value of transactions typically processed each year—around $71.5 million. 
This can manifest in the fraudulent purchase of goods and services or the fraudulent 
payment of fictitious invoices not represented by a legitimate purchase. 
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To mitigate these risks the accounts payable process relies on the following key 
controls: 
• segregation of duties around the set-up and maintenance of the vendor masterfile 
to prevent ‘dummy or duplicate’ vendors being established to process fictitious 
payments 
• verification of vendor details including their names, addresses and ABN numbers 
before they are set-up on the vendor masterfile to assure they are not fictitious  
• independently reviewing changes to the vendor masterfile and checking this 
against supporting documentation. 
While these controls were in place at Nillumbik and West Wimmera, there was a lack 
of segregation of duties at the remaining councils due to limited staffing and resources.  
Accounts payable staff at these councils can create and edit vendor details as well as 
enter invoices for payment, which increases the opportunity for fraud. However, both 
Maroondah and Moira have reasonable compensating controls. An independent officer 
at each council reviews changes to the vendor masterfile including consulting 
supporting documentation on a monthly basis. While this does not prevent a fraud from 
occurring, it increases the chances of detection and thus acts as a deterrent. 
This was not the case at Buloke. While an independent officer similarly signs-off on a 
report of changes to vendor bank details, it is not supported by any documentation 
substantiating the changes. Without this, the council is unable to verify if the 
implemented changes are appropriate and, therefore, easily detect if a fraud has 
occurred. 
Further, at Buloke the vendor names, addresses and ABN numbers at initial set up are 
not verified or validated to assure they are correct before entering them into the 
account payable system. Our review of a sample of vendor details revealed that all 
ABN numbers had been incorrectly entered. Although this was not due to fraud, it 
demonstrates that fictitious vendors could be set up with little chance of detection. 
Figure 3B highlights the importance of verifying vendor details. 
  Figure 3B
Case studies: Accounts payable frauds  
In 2001 the New York CPA Journal reported a case where a department head set up a 
dummy corporation on the vendor masterfile and used his home address as the mailing 
address.  
Over a two-year period, the officer submitted false invoices for more than $250 000.  
The fraud was eventually detected when a new employee noticed that the vendor’s address 
matched the officer’s address.   
In another case, an IT manager from a Victorian outer metropolitan council defrauded more 
than $1.5 million between 2005 and 2008 in collusion with other external parties. The fraud 
involved submitting over 100 invoices from three fake IT companies of which the offenders 
were directors. The fraud was revealed when a council accountant investigated anomalous 
payments in financial records. The offenders were prosecuted and received prison 
sentences. 
Source: Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. 
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3.3.2 Asset management 
Assets 
The examined councils are responsible for managing around $2.5 billion in assets. It is 
important they have sound controls to help prevent the theft or inappropriate use of 
these assets. 
Maroondah, Nillumbik and Moira had adequate processes to safeguard their assets 
but there was scope for improvement at the remaining two councils.  
Key controls for mitigating the misuse or theft of assets include: 
• maintaining an accurate and complete asset register with clear asset descriptions 
• assigning unique asset numbers to individual assets so they can be identified 
• storing assets securely 
• carrying out regular stocktakes or spot-checks to confirm the existence of assets. 
Neither Buloke nor West Wimmera maintained an up-to-date asset register, or had 
assigned a unique ID to all assets so they could be traced. Additionally, West Wimmera 
did not do regular stocktakes. These weaknesses create an opportunity for assets to 
be misappropriated and misused with little chance of detection. 
Buloke maintained three asset registers. However, they had not been recently 
reconciled against the general ledger to assure they were accurate and complete. Our 
review identified an ID Card Printer that could not be found on the councils asset 
registers and another asset—a trailer frame tool box valued at $1 560—that could not 
be physically located. The council was unable to explain where this asset was. It also 
advised that the ID Card Printer was missing from the asset register as it had been 
incorrectly classified as an expense item. The theft of assets cannot be easily detected 
if they are not routinely and accurately recorded on the asset register. 
Buloke commenced action to update its asset registers during the audit. It also advised 
that it had begun work on establishing a unique identifier for all assets and had 
introduced a policy clarifying the items which need to be recorded on the asset 
register.  
Similarly at West Wimmera we identified three assets—an antique table, desk top 
computer and a laptop—that were not listed in the general ledger or asset register. The 
council was also unable to explain why these assets were not recorded in the asset 
register.  
  
Key internal fraud controls 
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Recommendations 
Councils should: 
6. establish effective pre-employment screening processes that provide sufficient 
assurance over the integrity, identity and credentials of all council staff 
7. make sure accounts payable systems have effective preventative and/or 
compensating controls that adequately mitigate the risk of fraudulent purchases 
and/or payments 
8. maintain accurate and an up-to-date asset registers that are regularly reviewed to 
mitigate the misuse and/or misappropriation of assets 
9. systematically review the operation and effectiveness of all their internal control 
systems to assure they adequately prevent, deter and detect major frauds. 
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Appendix A. 
 Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
Introduction 
In accordance with section 16(3) of the Audit Act 1994 a copy of this report was 
provided to the Department of Planning and Community Development, Maroondah City 
Council, Nillumbik Shire Council, Moira Shire Council, Buloke Shire Council and West 
Wimmera Shire Council with a request for submissions or comments. 
The submission and comments provided are not subject to audit nor the evidentiary 
standards required to reach an audit conclusion. Responsibility for the accuracy, 
fairness and balance of those comments rests solely with the agency head. 
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RESPONSE provided by the Secretary, Department of Planning and Community 
Development 
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RESPONSE provided by the Mayor and Chief Executive Officer, Maroondah City 
Council 
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RESPONSE provided by the Mayor and Chief Executive Officer, Maroondah City 
Council – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Mayor and Chief Executive Officer, Maroondah City 
Council – continued 
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Nillumbik Shire Council  
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RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, Nillumbik Shire Council – 
continued 
 
Appendix A. Audit Act 1994 section 16—submissions and comments 
36       Fraud Prevention Strategies in Local Government Victorian Auditor-General’s Report 
RESPONSE provided by the Chief Executive Officer, West Wimmera Shire 
Council 
 
 
Auditor-General’s reports 
Reports tabled during 2011–12 
 
Report title Date tabled 
Biotechnology in Victoria: the Public Sector's Investment (2011–12:1) August 2011 
Developing Cycling as a Safe and Appealing Mode of Transport (2011–12:2) August 2011 
Road Safety Camera Program (2011–12:3) August 2011 
Business Planning for Major Capital Works and Recurrent Services in 
Local Government (2011–12:4) 
September 2011 
Individualised Funding for Disability Services (2011–12:5) September 2011 
Supporting Changes in Farming Practices: Sustainable Irrigation (2011–12:6) October 2011 
Maternity Services: Capacity (2011–12:7) October 2011 
Procurement Practices in the Health Sector (2011–12:8) October 2011 
TAFE Governance (2011–12:9) October 2011 
Auditor-General’s Report on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 
2010–11 (2011–12:10) 
November 2011 
Public Hospitals: Results of the 2010–11 Audits (2011–12:11) November 2011 
Water Entities: Results of the 2010–11 Audits (2011–12:12)  November 2011 
Portfolio Departments and Associated Entities: Results of the 2010–11 Audits 
(2011–12:13) 
November 2011 
Local Government: Results of the 2010–11 Audits (2011–12:14) November 2011 
Victorian Institute of Teaching (2011–12:15) December 2011 
Managing Contaminated Sites (2011–12:16) December 2011 
Compliance with Building Permits (2011–12:17) December 2011 
Management of Road Bridges (2011–12:18) December 2011 
State Trustees Limited: Management of represented persons (2011–12:19) February 2012 
Public Transport Performance (2011–12:20) February 2012 
Government Advertising and Communications (2011–12:21) February 2012 
Agricultural Food Safety (2011–12:22) March 2012 
Melbourne Market Redevelopment (2011–12:23) March 2012 
Access to Public Housing (2011–12:24) March 2012 
 
 Report title Date tabled 
Freedom of Information (2011–12:25) April 2012 
Casual Relief Teacher Arrangements Performance (2011–12:26) April 2012 
Performance Reporting by Local Government (2011–12:27) April 2012 
Personal Expense Reimbursement, Travel Expenses and Corporate Credit Cards 
(2011–12:28) 
May 2012 
Payments to Visiting Medical Officers in Rural and Regional Hospitals  
(2011–12:29) 
May 2012 
Tertiary Education and Other Entities: Results of the 2011 Audits (2011–12:30) May 2012 
Management of Trust Funds in the Justice Portfolio (2011–12:31) May 2012 
VAGO’s website at www.audit.vic.gov.au contains a comprehensive list of all reports issued by VAGO. 
The full text of the reports issued is available at the website.  
 
Availability of reports 
Copies of all reports issued by the Victorian Auditor-General's Office are available 
from: 
• Victorian Government Bookshop  
Level 20, 80 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic. 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: 1300 366 356 (local call cost) 
Fax: +61 3 9603 9920 
Email: bookshop@dbi.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.bookshop.vic.gov.au 
• Victorian Auditor-General's Office  
Level 24, 35 Collins Street  
Melbourne Vic. 3000  
AUSTRALIA 
Phone: +61 3 8601 7000   
Fax: +61 3 8601 7010  
Email: comments@audit.vic.gov.au 
Website: www.audit.vic.gov.au 
 
